Gwynn v. City of Philadelphia by unknown
2013 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-19-2013 
Gwynn v. City of Philadelphia 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013 
Recommended Citation 
"Gwynn v. City of Philadelphia" (2013). 2013 Decisions. 610. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013/610 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2013 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
                                                                         PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-2208 
___________ 
 
MICHAEL GWYNN;  
BRENDON RYAN,  
                                                 Appellants 
 
v. 
 
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; CHARLES RAMSEY;  
PATRICK KELLY; MELVIN SINGLETON;  
SALVATORE FEDE; FRANK PALOMBO 
__________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 11-cv-01128) 
District Judge:  Honorable Robert E. Kelly 
___________ 
 
Argued April 16, 2013 
Before:  AMBRO, HARDIMAN and COWEN, Circuit 
Judges. 
 
(Filed: June 19, 2013) 
 
 2 
 
Brian M. Puricelli [ARGUED] 
Law Offices of Brian Puricelli 
691 Washington Crossing Road 
Newtown, PA 18940-0000 
 Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellants 
 
Kelly S. Diffily 
Jane L. Istvan [ARGUED] 
Shant H. Zakarian 
City of Philadelphia 
Law Department 
17th Floor 
1515 Arch Street 
One Parkway 
Philadelphia, PA 19102 
 Attorneys for Defendant-Appellees 
 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 City of Philadelphia Police Officers Michael Gwynn 
and Brendon Ryan appeal a summary judgment entered in 
favor of several of their fellow officers and the City.  
Appellants asserted constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983, statutory claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 
and various state law claims.  For the reasons that follow, we 
will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
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I 
 As this appeal comes to us following summary 
judgment, we review the facts in the light most favorable to 
Appellants.  See Montone v. City of Jersey City, 709 F.3d 
181, 189 (3d Cir. 2013). 
A 
On December 15, 2009, while on duty, Appellants 
stopped and frisked men they believed were engaged in an 
illegal drug transaction.  One of the men they frisked, 
Keyshawn Artis, accused Appellants of stealing money from 
him.  Appellants denied the accusation, and told Artis to 
―move along.‖ 
 When Appellants returned to headquarters, a superior 
officer, Sergeant Salvatore Fede, ordered them into his office.  
After informing Appellants that a complaint about their 
behavior had been made to the Internal Affairs Bureau, 
Sergeant Fede took Appellants to Captain Melvin Singleton’s 
office.  Appellants did not feel free to leave because they had 
been ―ordered to be in the captain’s office.‖  App. 285.  After 
waiting fifteen to twenty minutes, Appellants and Sergeant 
Fede were joined by Captain Singleton, then-Sergeant Patrick 
Kelly, and Lieutenant Frank Palumbo. 
 Appellants were instructed to stay in Captain 
Singleton’s office until officers from the Internal Affairs 
Bureau arrived.  While Appellants waited, Captain Singleton 
offered them water and told them that they could watch 
television, but instructed them not to use their cell phones.  
Appellants then were questioned about their interaction with 
Artis, including whether they had taken money from him.  In 
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that regard, Appellants were asked to remove their jackets 
and Gwynn was asked to remove his outer vest.  Appellants 
also were told to pull out their pockets, pull up their pant legs 
and pull down their socks, and open their wallets.  Finally, 
Appellants were told that cooperation would be in their ―best 
interest‖ insofar as it could demonstrate to Internal Affairs 
that they did not have Artis’s money when they returned from 
their patrol.  During the hour or so they spent in Captain 
Singleton’s office while awaiting the arrival of Internal 
Affairs officers, Appellants did as they were told because the 
orders came from their ―superiors and supervisors,‖ and they 
feared ―discipline and possible loss of employment‖ if they 
disobeyed.  App. 241. 
 Upon their arrival at Captain Singleton’s office, two 
Internal Affairs officers questioned Appellants for about 
fifteen to twenty minutes and then left briefly to talk to Artis, 
the complainant.  Appellants were told to stay put until the 
Internal Affairs officers returned after speaking with Artis.  
As Appellants waited, Gwynn asked for permission to call his 
wife to arrange for her to pick up their son, and then-Sergeant 
Kelly granted permission.  The Internal Affairs officers 
returned, stated that they believed Artis, and told Appellants 
that they were not needed for anything further that day.  
Appellants left Captain Singleton’s office around 8:15 p.m. 
and when they opened their lockers that evening, it appeared 
as though they had been searched. 
B 
 In February 2011, Appellants sued Captain Singleton, 
Lieutenant Kelly, Sergeant Fede, and Lieutenant Palumbo 
along with the City and its Police Commissioner, Charles 
Ramsey.  Since Appellants’ claims arose under federal and 
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state law, the District Court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367. 
Appellants served requests for admission in June 2011 
that went unanswered until the beginning of August 2011, 
after the 30-day deadline prescribed by the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(3).  Because 
Appellants’ requests for admission were deemed admitted by 
operation of Rule 36, Appellees filed a motion in the District 
Court on September 9, 2011, to withdraw those admissions.  
The District Court granted that motion, gave Appellees ten 
additional days to respond, and extended the discovery period 
for 60 days. 
The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment 
and the District Court granted the motion of Appellees.  
Gwynn and Ryan filed this timely appeal, which we have 
jurisdiction to hear pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
II 
 Gwynn and Ryan first argue that the District Court 
abused its discretion when it allowed Appellees to withdraw 
their admissions.  Had those admissions remained 
undisturbed, Appellants argue, their summary judgment 
motion would have been granted.  Because the District Court 
did not err when it allowed Appellees to withdraw their 
admissions, we reject Appellants’ first argument. 
 Rule 36(a)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides that a request for admission is deemed admitted if a 
party does not respond within 30 days.  Nevertheless, courts 
may permit withdrawal of the admission if: (1) doing so 
―would promote the presentation of the merits of the action‖; 
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and (2) ―the court is not persuaded that it would prejudice the 
requesting party in maintaining or defending the action on the 
merits.‖  Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(b).  Courts may consider other 
factors as well, such as whether the moving party can show 
good cause for the delay, see Conlon v. United States, 474 
F.3d 616, 625 (9th Cir. 2007), but they are not required to do 
so, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(b). 
 Here, the District Court’s discretionary decision to 
permit Appellees to withdraw the admissions was consistent 
with both requirements of Rule 36(b).  Upholding the 
admissions would have significantly interfered with 
Appellees’ ability to present the merits of their case, and 
Appellants have failed to identify any prejudice they suffered 
as a result of the withdrawal.  In their brief, Appellants state 
that counsel ―detrimentally relied‖ upon the admissions as 
indicated at pages 6–8 of their opposition to the motion in the 
District Court.  There, Appellants argued that counsel had not 
moved to compel discovery of certain documents in reliance 
on the admissions—a concern that was adequately addressed 
by the extension of the discovery deadline.  Appellants 
further argued that counsel had ―developed a litigation 
strategy that placed reliance on the conclusive facts deemed 
from the Admissions.‖  Dkt. No. 9 at 8.  ―The prejudice 
contemplated by Rule 36(b),‖ however ―is not simply that the 
party who obtained the admission now has to convince the 
jury of its truth.  Something more is required.‖  Bergemann v. 
United States, 820 F.2d 1117, 1121 (10th Cir. 1987). 
In sum, because the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion when it withdrew Appellees’ deemed admissions, it 
did not err when it denied Appellants’ motion for summary 
judgment, which was premised upon the efficacy of those 
admissions. 
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III 
 Appellants next argue that the District Court erred 
when it entered summary judgment against them on their 
constitutional claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well 
as their claims for false imprisonment and violations of the 
Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act, 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 
333.101 et seq., and the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 201 et seq.
1
  We exercise plenary review over summary 
judgments, Howley v. Mellon Fin. Corp., 625 F.3d 788, 792 
(3d Cir. 2010), and will affirm if ―the movant shows that 
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,‖ Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 56(a). 
A 
 Appellants’ constitutional arguments are founded upon 
the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, as applied to the States through the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Specifically, Gwynn and Ryan 
claim they were unreasonably seized when they were ordered 
to wait in Captain Singleton’s office until the Internal Affairs 
officers arrived, and that they were unreasonably searched 
when their superiors asked them to turn out their pockets, take 
off outer layers of clothing, and reveal the contents of their 
socks and wallets.  Although it is not entirely clear from their 
brief, Appellants seem also to contend that Appellees 
conducted an unreasonable search of their lockers.  Viewing 
                                                 
1
 Appellants also asserted a First Amendment claim for 
retaliation in their complaint, but they do not now challenge 
its dismissal. 
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the record in the light most favorable to Appellants, the 
District Court did not err when it granted summary judgment 
because Appellants failed to establish either that they were 
seized or that they were subjected to an unreasonable search. 
1 
 A person is seized under the Fourth Amendment only 
when ―his freedom of movement is restrained‖ either ―by 
means of physical force or a show of authority.‖  United 
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553 (1980) (explaining 
that ―[o]nly when such restraint is imposed is there any 
foundation whatever for invoking constitutional safeguards‖).  
Police officers, no less than civilians, are protected by the 
Fourth Amendment, and, in some circumstances, they may be 
seized as the result of an order given by another officer.  See 
Driebel v. City of Milwaukee, 298 F.3d 622, 637 (7th Cir. 
2002) (recognizing ―the well-settled rule that men and women 
do not surrender their freedoms when joining the police 
force‖); see also Cerrone v. Brown, 246 F.3d 194, 196 (2d 
Cir. 2001) (explaining that when police officers are seized in 
the context of a criminal investigation, probable cause is 
required). 
 This does not mean, however, that every order a police 
officer feels compelled to obey amounts to a seizure.  Public 
employees, like their counterparts in the private sector, often 
must comply with orders issued by supervisors, and may 
suffer work-related consequences if they disobey.  See INS v. 
Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 218 (1984) (―Ordinarily, when people 
are at work their freedom to move about has been 
meaningfully restricted . . . by the workers’ voluntary 
obligations to their employers.‖).  This is especially true for 
police officers, who are part of a ―paramilitary organization 
 9 
 
that must maintain the highest degree of discipline, 
confidentiality, efficiency, and espirit [sic] de corps among its 
officers, who are the first line of defense against lawlessness.‖  
Driebel, 298 F.3d at 638–39.  Officers are trained to obey 
orders from their superiors and may be subject to discipline if 
they fail to do so.  Id. at 639.  Characterizing work-related 
demands as seizures whenever an officer feels compelled to 
obey them would not further any interest protected by the 
Fourth Amendment, and it would significantly interfere with 
the effective management of police forces.  See Mendenhall, 
446 U.S. at 553–54 (explaining that the purpose of the Fourth 
Amendment is ―to prevent arbitrary and oppressive 
interference by enforcement officials with the privacy and 
personal security of individuals‖ (quoting United States v. 
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976))); O’Connor v. 
Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 722 (1987) (acknowledging ―the 
common-sense realization that government offices could not 
function if every employment decision became a 
constitutional matter‖ (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 
138, 143 (1983))). 
 To determine whether a police officer has been seized 
for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, our sister courts of 
appeals have recognized that the distinction between 
situations in which the police department issues orders ―in its 
capacity as an employer‖ and those in which it acts ―as the 
law enforcement arm of the state.‖  Pennington v. Metro. 
Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 511 F.3d 647, 652 (6th 
Cir. 2008) (quoting Driebel, 298 F.3d at 637); see also 
Aguilera v. Baca, 510 F.3d 1161, 1169 (9th Cir. 2007).  An 
officer is not seized ―simply because he believes that he 
[would] lose his job‖ or suffer other work-related 
consequences if he were to leave the police station or fail to 
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report to a designated area.  Pennington, 511 F.3d at 652.  
Rather, an officer is seized if a reasonable person in his 
position would believe that he were not actually free to 
disobey the command—that is, if he feared he would be 
detained if he attempted to leave.  Id.  We agree with the 
Courts of Appeals for the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits 
that the distinction between police conduct qua employer and 
police conduct qua law enforcement agent is a valid one. 
 For example, in Driebel v. City of Milwaukee, an 
officer who was subject to an internal investigation was 
ordered to ―stand by‖ at the police station until he received 
further instructions.  298 F.3d at 629.  While waiting at the 
garage, he was neither told that he was the subject of a 
criminal investigation nor was he read his Miranda rights.  Id. 
at 643.  He received overtime pay for the assignment and 
retained possession of his police-issued equipment while 
waiting.  Id.  The Seventh Circuit held that this was not a 
seizure, explaining that the officer ―must have been aware 
that no officer was permitted to use force or any show of 
authority to prevent him from departing the garage if he so 
chose.‖  Id.  
 Driebel also addressed the claims of another officer 
under investigation, who was ordered to report to Internal 
Affairs headquarters for questioning.  While there, he was 
advised that he was under criminal investigation and read his 
Miranda rights, and he was not permitted to use the restroom 
unaccompanied.  Id. at 648.  Police policy required, however, 
that officers be told their rights any time they were 
questioned, even as part of an internal investigation.  Id.  The 
Internal Affairs officers also had a legitimate reason for 
supervising his trips to the restroom, namely, to ensure that he 
was not communicating with others about the investigation.  
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Id.  In addition, the officer was not told that he was suspected 
of any particular crime; he was not addressed in a threatening 
manner; he retained his police-issued equipment; and he was 
compensated for his time at the headquarters.  Id.  Although 
noting that this second incident was a more borderline case, 
the Seventh Circuit also determined that this was not a 
seizure.  Id. at 648–49. 
 The Sixth Circuit applied the same analysis in 
Pennington v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and 
Davidson County.  There, while in a bar, off-duty police 
officer Pennington was involved in an altercation in which he 
identified himself as a police officer.  511 F.3d at 648.  
Officers in his department were required to comply with 
department policy whenever they invoked their authority as 
police officers, and that policy forbade intoxication.  Id. at 
649.  Another officer who arrived at the scene asked 
Pennington to return to the station for a breathalyzer test as 
part of an internal investigation.  Pennington was neither 
handcuffed and placed in the back seat of the police car nor 
read his Miranda rights, and he was allowed to return home 
before completing a report.  Id.  He did not believe that he 
would be forcibly detained if he attempted to leave; rather he 
claimed he was ―compelled by the threat of job loss‖ to 
comply.  Id. at 652.  The Sixth Circuit explained that ―[a] 
reasonable off-duty officer in Pennington’s position would 
not have feared seizure or detention if he had refused to take 
the breathalyzer test.‖  Id.  Accordingly, Pennington had not 
been seized.  Id. 
 Likewise, in Aguilera v. Baca, the Ninth Circuit held 
that officers who were ordered to stay after work to speak to 
Internal Affairs officers had not been seized. 510 F.3d at 
1169.  The court emphasized that the department’s treatment 
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of the officers differed from its treatment of detained criminal 
suspects.  Id. at 1170.  For example, the officers waited in 
unlocked rooms with intermittent supervision and no request 
to leave was denied.  The officers also remained in possession 
of their police-issued equipment.  In addition, they were 
asked if they wanted food or drink; they were free to use the 
restroom unattended and free to leave after the interview; and 
they were paid overtime.  Id.  The Ninth Circuit explained 
that to characterize their treatment as a seizure ―would equate 
to a pronouncement that a law enforcement agency cannot, 
even under . . . the agency’s general policies to preserve 
public confidence and the integrity of its personnel in the 
discharge of their public safety responsibilities, order its 
employees to cooperate in an investigation of possible officer 
misconduct by standing by at their duty station after the end 
of their watch.‖  Id. at 1171; see also Fournier v. Reardon, 
160 F.3d 754, 757 (1st Cir. 1998) (plaintiff was not ―seized‖ 
when he submitted to being handcuffed as part of a basic 
training academy course, even though objecting to such 
treatment may have had negative consequences for his 
continued employment). 
 The facts in Driebel, Pennington, and Aguilera stand 
in contrast to those presented to the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit in Cerrone v. Brown.  There, the officer was 
stopped by the investigative team, who ―asked whether he 
was carrying a weapon, allegedly placed him in the felony 
position, placed him in the back of an unmarked police car 
(where he was guarded), transported him to a hotel room, 
read him his Miranda rights, and informed him that he was 
the target of a criminal investigation.‖  Cerrone, 246 F.3d at 
198 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).  The 
police officers conceded that their actions amounted to a 
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seizure, so the court did not reach the issue.  Nevertheless, 
these are the kinds of circumstances that would make an 
officer feel he was not free to leave—not by virtue of being 
an employee of the police department, but as a citizen who 
was being detained.  See Driebel, 298 F.3d at 649 (explaining 
that a jury could find that a seizure occurred when an officer 
grabbed another officer, turned him around, and directed him 
toward the squad car). 
 We recognize that whether a police officer would 
reasonably have perceived his superior officer to be issuing 
orders as his supervisor or as a law enforcement agent during 
the course of an investigation will not always be clear.  Here, 
however, the evidence demonstrated that, to the extent 
Appellants felt compelled to obey their superior officers’ 
commands, that compulsion was borne out of their 
employment relationship.  There was no suggestion that 
Appellants were under criminal investigation; they were 
asked to wait in Captain Singleton’s office so they could 
speak with Internal Affairs agents.  Additionally, the 
circumstances surrounding the investigation were not 
particularly coercive.  Although Appellants were not able to 
use the phone while waiting for Captain Singleton to return, 
they were offered drinks, they were asked if they wanted to 
watch television, and they retained all of their police-issued 
equipment.  Moreover, Appellants admitted in their affidavits 
and deposition testimony that they followed the orders of 
their superior officers because they were concerned that they 
would suffer work-related consequences if they did not do so.  
For these reasons, we hold there was no Fourth Amendment 
seizure of Gwynn and Ryan. 
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2 
 Appellants also argue that their superior officers 
conducted an unreasonable search when they asked 
Appellants to reveal whether they had money in their pockets, 
vests, or socks and when they went through Appellants’ 
lockers without probable cause or a warrant.  Although the 
Fourth Amendment protects government employees against 
unreasonable searches by their employers, O’Connor, 480 
U.S. at 715, work-related searches of a government 
employee’s person or property often fall into the ―special 
government needs‖ exception to the Fourth Amendment’s 
warrant and probable cause requirements.  We find that to be 
the case here as well.
2
  
 When an ―intrusion serves special government needs, 
beyond the normal need for law enforcement,‖ the 
government must show that its search was reasonable.  
Wilcher v. City of Wilmington, 139 F.3d 366, 373–74 (3d Cir. 
1998) (quoting Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 
489 U.S. 656, 665–66 (1989)).  In O’Connor v. Ortega, the 
Supreme Court held in a plurality opinion that a non-criminal 
investigative search will be reasonable if, at its inception, 
―there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search 
will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-
                                                 
2
  Contrary to Appellants’ suggestion in their Rule 28j 
letter, the Supreme Court’s decision in Missouri v. McNeely, 
133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013), has no bearing on this analysis.  At 
issue in McNeely was whether the natural metabolization of 
alcohol in the bloodstream is necessarily an exigent 
circumstance justifying a warrantless search.  Id. at 1556.  
That decision does not address the special needs doctrine. 
 
 15 
 
related misconduct,‖ 480 U.S. at 726, and ―the measures 
adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search 
and not excessively intrusive in light of the nature of the 
misconduct,‖ id. (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 
342 (1985)) (alterations omitted); see also City of Ontario, 
Cal. v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2630 (2010).
3
  The Supreme 
Court explained that this lower standard is appropriate for 
work-related investigations because ―[p]ublic employers have 
an interest in ensuring that their agencies operate in an 
effective and efficient manner, and the work of these agencies 
inevitably suffers from the inefficiency, incompetence, 
mismanagement, or other work-related misfeasance of its 
employees.‖  O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 724.  It emphasized that, 
―in many cases, public employees are entrusted with 
tremendous responsibility, and the consequences of their 
misconduct or incompetence to both the agency and the 
public interest can be severe.‖  Id. 
 The need for oversight and corrective action is 
particularly acute in police departments.  This is because 
officers ―exercis[e] the most awesome and dangerous power 
that a democratic state possesses with respect to its 
residents—the power to use lawful force to arrest and detain 
                                                 
3
 Justice Scalia, concurring in O’Connor, stated that he 
would hold that ―government searches to retrieve work-
related materials or to investigate violations of workplace 
rules—searches of the sort that are regarded as reasonable and 
normal in the private-employer context—do not violate the 
Fourth Amendment.‖  480 U.S. at 732; see also Quon, 130 S. 
Ct. at 2628.  The search here was an investigation of 
violations of workplace rules, and, as such, would meet this 
alternative standard as well. 
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them.‖  Policemen’s Benevolent Ass’n of N.J., Local 318 v. 
Washington Twp., 850 F.2d 133, 141 (3d Cir. 1988) 
(emphasizing the need for ―public confidence, respect and 
approbation‖ with respect to police officers); see also 
Aguilera, 510 F.3d at 1168 (explaining that society has an 
―important interest in ensuring the highest integrity by those 
entrusted with discharging the duties of a peace officer‖); 
Shields v. Burge, 874 F.2d 1201, 1204 (7th Cir. 1989) (―The 
public and government have strong interests in ferreting out 
misconduct by police officers.‖). 
 As noted herein, the investigation into Appellants’ 
conduct was work related; it was not a criminal investigation.  
Their superior officers had reasonable grounds to investigate 
misconduct in view of the formal complaint Artis made to 
Internal Affairs.  Indeed, Ryan acknowledged that he 
understood why his superiors would need to investigate 
Artis’s claim.  Further, the search was not excessively 
intrusive given the nature of the alleged misconduct.  
Appellants’ superior officers examined their outer clothing, 
wallets, pockets, socks, and the cuffs of their pants to see if 
they had a large amount of money on them, and checked their 
lockers for the same purpose.  The search was reasonably 
related to its purpose—that is, ensuring that Appellants did 
not possess Artis’s money—and it was not overly intrusive.  
Cf. Copeland v. Phila. Police Dep’t, 840 F.2d 1139, 1143–44 
(3d Cir. 1988) (compulsory urinalysis, based on reasonable 
suspicion that officer had engaged in drug use, was not a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment).  Because the search was 
not unreasonable, it did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
4
 
                                                 
4
 Appellants further challenge the dismissal of two 
other related claims.  First, they argue that the District Court 
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B 
 Appellants also claim they were not credited for 
working overtime on the day of the Internal Affairs interview, 
in violation of the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act and the 
Fair Labor Standards Act.  Appellees presented evidence, in 
the form of an affidavit from Lieutenant Palumbo and the 
police department’s daily attendance report, that Appellants 
were, in fact, paid.  Appellants failed to produce any evidence 
to rebut that evidence. 
On appeal, Appellants challenge the adequacy of 
Appellees’ evidence of payment.  They claim that the 
affidavit from Lieutenant Palumbo was not based on personal 
                                                                                                             
erred in dismissing their false imprisonment claim.  To 
establish false imprisonment under Pennsylvania law, 
Appellants were required to show that:  (1) they had been 
detained; and (2) the detention was unlawful.  Renk v. City of 
Pittsburgh, 641 A.2d 289, 293 (Pa. 1994).  Appellants 
contend that they were unlawfully detained when they were 
unreasonably seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment.  
As discussed above, there was no seizure, and thus, there was 
no unlawful detention.  See James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 
700 F.3d 675, 682–83 (3d Cir. 2012).  Second, Appellants 
contend the District Court erred in dismissing their claim 
under ―the Due Process Clause and the 14th Amendment, 
which protects liberty interests.‖  Gwynn Br. at 23.  
Appellants merely allude to this claim in their briefing, where 
they incorrectly contend that ―the district court failed to even 
mention the claim.‖  Gwynn Br. at 23–24; but see Gwynn v. 
City of Phila., 866 F. Supp. 2d 473, 488 n.10 (E.D. Pa. 2012).  
Appellants have failed to raise any substantive challenge to 
the dismissal of this claim. 
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knowledge and the daily attendance report was not properly 
authenticated.  This argument disregards the applicable 
burden of proof, however.  Appellants, as the plaintiffs, were 
required to present some evidence showing that they were not 
credited for working overtime.  See Anderson v. Mt. Clemens 
Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 686–87 (1946), superseded by 
statute on other grounds as stated in IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 
U.S. 21, 41 (2005).  They identified no such evidence in their 
response to the motion for summary judgment—not even in 
the form of affidavits, stating under oath that they had not 
been paid.  Indeed, Gwynn stated in his deposition that he did 
not know whether he had been paid overtime for December 
15, 2009.  Thus, the District Court did not err when it granted 
summary judgment on this claim. 
* * * 
 Police officers serve a critical function in any civilized 
society.  The power they wield and the responsibilities they 
assume require them to act beyond reproach.  When a citizen 
lodges a credible complaint of police misconduct, it is 
imperative that it is investigated, both to protect the citizen 
who may be wronged and the officers who may be falsely 
accused.  When police administrators undertake employment-
related detentions such as the one experienced by Officers 
Gwynn and Ryan, there is no Fourth Amendment seizure.  
And because the searches of Gwynn and Ryan were 
reasonable, we will affirm the summary judgment of the 
District Court. 
 
